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Abstract 
This paper shows that real effective exchange rate (REER) regressions, the standard 
approach for estimating the response of aggregate exports to exchange rate changes, imply 
biased estimates of the underlying elasticities. We provide a new aggregate regression 
specification that is consistent with bilateral trade flows micro-founded by the gravity 
equation. This theory-consistent aggregation leads to unbiased estimates when prices are 
set in an international currency as postulated by the dominant currency paradigm. We use 
Monte-Carlo simulations to compare elasticity estimates based on this new “ideal-REER” 
regression against typical regression specifications found in the REER literature. The 
results show that the biases are small (around 1 percent) for the exchange rate and large 
(around 10 percent) for the demand elasticity. We find empirical support for this prediction 
from annual trade flow data. The difference between elasticities estimated on the bilateral 
and aggregate levels reduces significantly when applying an ideal-REER regression rather 
than a standard REER approach. 
Bank topics: Econometric and statistical methods; Exchange rates; International topics 
JEL codes : F11, F12, F31, F32 
 
Résumé 
La présente étude montre que l’approche couramment employée pour estimer l’incidence 
des variations du taux de change sur les exportations totales, qui se base sur des régressions 
du taux de change effectif réel (TCER), implique des estimations biaisées des élasticités 
sous-jacentes. Nous proposons une nouvelle spécification reposant sur des régressions 
agrégées qui est compatible avec une dérivation des flux commerciaux bilatéraux par le 
modèle de gravité. Conforme à la théorie, cette approche débouche sur des estimations non 
biaisées lorsque les prix sont établis dans une monnaie internationale, soit la monnaie de 
l’économie dominante dans les échanges. Les auteurs utilisent la méthode de Monte-Carlo 
pour comparer les estimations des élasticités obtenues au moyen de ces nouvelles 
régressions d’un TCER dit « idéal » avec celles obtenues au moyen des spécifications 
communément utilisées dans les études impliquant le TCER. Les résultats indiquent que le 
biais est faible (autour de 1 %) pour le taux de change, et prononcé (autour de 10 %) pour 
l’élasticité de la demande. Ces observations sont confortées de manière empirique par les 
données sur les flux commerciaux annuels. L’écart entre les estimations des élasticités aux 
niveaux bilatéral et agrégé est bien moins important avec notre spécification qu’avec 
l’approche standard. 
Sujets : Méthodes économétriques et statistiques; Taux de change; Questions 
internationales 




Regressions that explain total exports using real effective exchange rates (REER) are ubiquitous 
in applied policy work, but they are often based on incorrect aggregation of theory-consistent 
bilateral trade equations and lead to biased estimates of trade elasticities. Models calibrated with 
these elasticities will have predictions that are inaccurate by exaggerating the response of exports 
and, by extension, output following an exchange rate shock. 
This paper shows that standard REER regressions produce biased results, documents the source of 
the bias and proposes a new alternative regression specification. Our specification is consistent 
with bilateral trade flows and micro-founded by the gravity equation. Total exports are a function 
of the real exchange rate and foreign demand deflated by the destination-specific price index, all 
denominated in the dominant international currency (i.e., the US dollar). Denominating prices 
according to the dominant currency paradigm (DCP) has the key implication that pass-through 
depends on the exchange rate variation relative to the international currency and not on the bilateral 
exchange rate. This allows us to split the change in the relative price between the exporter and the 
importer into two components each denominated in the international currency. This separation 
provides for theory-consistent aggregation and unbiased estimation of the trade and demand 
elasticities. 
Simulations of the theoretical model imply that standard REER regressions lead to significant 
aggregation bias in the underlying elasticities. The bias in the trade elasticity is rather small (close 
to 1 percent), while the bias in the demand elasticity is more pronounced (close to 10 percent), and 
both increase with measurement errors.  
We show that calibrating macroeconomic models with estimates obtained by using our new 
regression specification improves their fit and results in predictions consistent with microeconomic 
behavior in bilateral trade equations. 
1 Introduction
Regressions that explain total exports with real effective exchange rates (REERs) are ubiquitous in
applied policy work,1 but their analytical structures are only loosely based on trade theory. These
open-economy “macro-level” regressions rely on monadic export equations where a country’s change
in total exports is the dependent variable with the REER as the main variable of interest and an addi-
tional control is considered for demand changes faced by the country. Despite considerable progress
in the econometric aspects, the fundamental specification of McGuirk (1986), which derives its re-
gression specification from Armington (1969), has remained virtually unchanged over the past few
decades.2 During the same period, considerable progress has been made in modeling the “micro-
level” foundations of dyadic (bilateral) trade equations, which are called gravity equations. A seminal
paper in the gravity literature is Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), which is also based on Arming-
ton (1969). In the gravity literature, little attention has been given to estimate the impact of changes
in the exchange rate (see Anderson et al. (2016) as a notable exception).3 In this paper, we reconnect
the two strands of the literature.
We start by assessing whether the standard approach of monadic macro regression is compat-
ible with the micro-founded gravity equation that predicts a very precise functional form for an
estimation explaining bilateral flows. Similar to Imbs and Méjean (2015), our paper is methodolog-
ical in that we seek to derive the appropriate monadic aggregation of bilateral flows and compare
our new “ideal-REER” approach with typical regressions from the standard REER literature. Differ-
ences arise due to the fact that the ideal-REER regression is based on proportional changes,4 while
McGuirk (1986)’s REER is based on partial derivatives (log changes). In the standard REER regres-
sion total exports are a log linear function of log changes of the real effective exchange rate and foreign
demand. On the other hand, the aggregate export equation that follows a structural gravity approach
implies a log-linear function of log changes in the real exchange rate (RER) and differences in foreign
demand deflated by the destination-specific price index. The standard REER approach constitutes
an approximation, which holds for small changes, and causes an aggregation bias.
The aggregation of bilateral trade flows inherently depends on the currency denomination. In
our baseline gravity model, prices are set in a common international currency following the domi-
1Global projection models of central banks and international policy institutions (for example, Jakab et al. (2015)), the
literature on global VAR models (Di Mauro and Pesaran (2013)) as well as on global imbalances (see, among others, Ob-
stfeld and Rogoff (2005) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012)) rely on REER equations and their elasticities to summarize
the trade linkages between the different regions in their model.
2Debate and progress in econometric aspects of such work is still ongoing, see Chinn (2006) for a primer on alterna-
tive measures of REER. More recently, Bennett and Zarnic (2009) introduce product heterogeneity and services exports.
Bayoumi et al. (2013) and Bems and Johnson (2017) construct REER indexes based on value-added trade to account for
global value chains. Patel et al. (2017) build on Bayoumi et al. (2013) and Bems and Johnson (2017) to study how input
linkages affect REER measurement in a multi-sector economy.
3Most of the interest has been geared towards measuring the impact of bilateral trade costs, such as regional trade
agreements (RTAs), tariffs and membership at the WTO. See Head and Mayer (2014) for an overview.
4Often referred to as exact hat algebra. See Arkolakis et al. (2012).
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nant currency paradigm (DCP) as in Casas et al. (2017). DCP implies that the exchange rate variation
relative to the international (dominant) currency and not the bilateral exchange rate determines pass-
through. As a result, we can split the relative price between the exporter and the importer into the
sum of an exporter-specific (the RER) and an importer-specific component (foreign demand deflated
by the importer’s price index) each denominated in the international currency. This separation pro-
vides for theory-consistent aggregation and unbiased estimation of the trade and demand elasticities.
If prices are set in the producer’s currency (producer currency pricing (PCP)) or in the local currency
(local currency pricing (LCP)), the pass-through depends on the bilateral exchange rate and estima-
tion of the aggregate elasticities without bias is only possible if pass-through is complete. Extending
the model to allow markups to vary across trading partners reduces the response of prices to the
exchange rate change and lowers the bias in both the demand and the trade elasticities.
To reveal the importance of theory-consistent aggregation for parameter inference, we resort to
theoretical model simulations and quantify how departures from the model’s strict form can generate
biases in trade and demand elasticity estimates. To that purpose, we use the Dekle et al. (2007) ver-
sion of the structural gravity model (compatible with most of the commonly used theoretical models
of international trade). Monte Carlo simulations show that while there is discordance between the
ideal-REER and standard REER regressions, the magnitude of the biases in elasticities are dependent
on the precise regression specification as well as the underlying assumptions on the exchange rate
shock. Overall, the bias in the trade (exchange rate) elasticity is rather small (close to 1 percent),
while the bias in the demand elasticity is more pronounced (close to 10 percent) and increases with
measurement errors. If, instead, we re-estimate the same specifications and denominate trade in
the producer currency, the aggregation bias increases significantly, the overall fit of the regression
is lower, the point estimates of the elasticities are smaller and the standard errors are larger in all
specifications.
Next, we build on the theoretical basis of our paper and compare the empirical performance
of our ideal-REER with the standard REER approach. We use annual bilateral trade and price data
for 25 countries that are part of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) narrow effective ex-
change rate indexes (see Klau and Fung (2006)) for the period 1964 to 2014. As a first step, we follow
Boz et al. (2017) and run exchange rate pass-through regressions to test (1) whether pass-through is
complete, and (2) whether the pass-through depends on the currency denomination of export and
import prices. Our results show that, overall, pass-through is incomplete (with an average coeffi-
cient of 0.16) and both exporter and importer prices vary mainly with the US dollar supporting the
dominant currency paradigm. In the second step, we aggregate bilateral trade flows denominated in
US dollars and estimate the trade and demand elasticities for both the ideal-REER and the standard
REER regression specifications following the DCP. Evidence based on the pooled sample across all
countries, in addition to country-specific regressions, corroborate the simulation results. The differ-
ence between the elasticities estimated on the bilateral and the aggregate levels reduces significantly
when applying an ideal-REER regression rather than the standard REER approach.
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Taken together, these results highlight two additional advantages of the dominant currency
paradigm, which currently is the yardstick used in evaluating pricing and exchange rate pass-through
(see Boz et al. (2017) and Casas et al. (2017)). First, DCP allows for consistent aggregation of micro-
level founded bilateral trade equations with a minimum set of assumptions on the pricing behavior
and, second, the estimation performance of aggregate regressions improves significantly when de-
nominating the variables in US dollars.
Our paper contributes to the macroeconomic literature on exchange rate indexes as a measure
of price competitiveness. The REER is an important statistical indicator, produced by international
agencies such as the IMF (see Bayoumi et al. (2005)), the BIS (see Klau and Fung (2006)) and many
central banks (see Schmitz et al. (2011) for the ECB and Barnett et al. (2016) for the Bank of Canada
references). We see our analysis as complementary to the recent papers that study the theoretical
foundations for these indexes. These papers’ focus lies more in introducing global linkages into the
measurement of competitiveness (see Bayoumi et al. (2013), Patel et al. (2017) and Bems and Johnson
(2017)). We show that using the REER to estimate the aggregate response of exports leads to biased
estimates of the underlying elasticities. The bias exists due to functional form assumptions, currency
denomination and inconsistent weighting of trade flows in the aggregation of bilateral trade flows.
Our analysis also speaks to the old macroeconomic literature on estimating trade elasticities
started by Orcutt (1950), Houthakker and Magee (1969) and Goldstein et al. (1985) and recent con-
tributions by Spilimbergo and Vamvakidis (2003), Freund and Pierola (2012), Bussière et al. (2014a)
and Ahmed et al. (2016). All of these papers rely on effective exchange rates to estimate demand and
trade elasticities. Our results warrant caution in the use of these estimates for counterfactual policies,
particularly in the case of the demand elasticity, where bias can be significant. As an alternative, we
suggest our ideal-REER regression framework to mitigate these concerns. These conclusions also ap-
ply to studies that use aggregate time-series data to estimate exchange rate pass-through coefficients
such as Campa and Goldberg (2005), Vigfusson et al. (2009) and Bussière et al. (2014b).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 derives the gravity-compatible
aggregate export equation in the partial as well as in the general equilibrium. Section 3 describes
the standard empirical approaches used in the applied literature and discusses the functional form
differences with respect to the gravity approach. Section 4 quantifies the biases of the different spec-
ifications using Monte-Carlo simulations of partial as well as general equilibrium counterfactuals of
exchange rate shocks. Section 5 discusses the importance of the underlying pricing behavior and
currency denomination. Section 6 introduces the data and provides empirical evidence on the key
predictions of our theoretical framework. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The gravity approach
We start with a description of the structural gravity equation based on Head and Mayer (2014) de-
rived from the Armington model. The central feature of the Armington model is that it is not only at
the heart of the gravity equation literature but also forms the basis of the real exchange rate regres-
sions as in Artus and McGuirk (1981), McGuirk (1986) and Spilimbergo and Vamvakidis (2003).
2.1 Structural gravity
Consider a world economy consisting of N countries. Each country is endowed with Qn units of
a distinct good. In each country, the representative agent has Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) preferences. Trade between countries is costly and takes the form of iceberg trade costs. In
order to sell one unit of good i in country n, exporters from country i have to ship τni ≥ 1 units.
Trade within the country is costless, i.e., τii = 1. To prevent arbitrage opportunities, we assume
that trading bilaterally between i and n is always cheaper than trading via an intermediate country
k ( τnkτki ≥ τni for ∀i, j, k). Note that given country i’s endowment Qi and total income Yi, we can
express supply as Si = Yi/Qi, the corresponding producer price of good i as Pii = Si and the price
charged to consumers in country n to be Pni = τniSi. Given our assumptions, the gravity equation is
a product of the share of expenditure that importer n allocates on goods from exporter i, pini, and the
















where φni captures the bilateral accessibility of n to exporter i and is a function of iceberg trade costs,
Φn represents the multilateral resistance term and Ωi represents the weighted sum of the exporter
capabilities.
In order to quantify potential estimation biases and to produce counterfactual simulation esti-
mates of the structural gravity model, we need to specify the underlying supply structure. In this
paper, we opt for the Ricardian Comparative Advantage specification with intermediate inputs from
Dekle et al. (2007) based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007). In this model,
each country produces a large number of tradable intermediate goods that are homogeneous across
countries. Productivity z differs across goods and is assumed to follow a Fréchet distribution with
a cumulative distribution function of exp(−Tiz−θ), where Ti is a technology parameter and θ deter-
mines the amount of heterogeneity in the productivity distribution. For each intermediate good z,
buyers choose the lowest cost supplier in the world. Aggregating across all goods, assuming that
factor prices are denominated in the domestic currency as well as assuming complete pass-through,



























where wi is the wage paid to workers in i, pi is the price of tradable intermediate goods, ri is the
nominal exchange rate that converts domestic prices into a common international currency (the US
dollar, for instance) and β is the share of intermediate goods in the production of manufacturing
goods. Comparing equation (2) to equation (1) shows that the three structural gravity terms are given








, φni = τ−θni with θ as the trade elasticity and the multilateral resistance term
in international currency Φn = (rnPn)
−θ.
Asserting a market clearing condition implies that total output in i, Yi, corresponds to total
spending, Xi. With labor as the sole factor, the value of production in local currency in the country
of origin is given by Yi = wiLi. Following Dekle et al. (2007), the market clearing conditions for the
manufacturing sector in international currency become
riwiLi =∑
n
pini (wnLn + rnDn) ,
where Di is the overall trade deficit in local currency.5
At this point, it is important to note that while we chose the Eaton-Kortum variant of the gravity
model as the underlying theoretical foundation, all other theoretical models that adhere to structural
gravity are compatible with the following analysis on the estimation bias. The main difference will
be the underlying implications on the micro-structure and its corresponding interpretations.
2.2 Counterfactual analysis
To produce counterfactual analysis, we use the exact hat notation, see Dekle et al. (2007) and Arko-
lakis et al. (2012), to derive the aggregate export equation. More precisely, hats denote the ratio
of post-shock to pre-shock values. We start by assessing the change in bilateral exports and then
aggregate to obtain the change in total exports. For bilateral exports of country i to country n in









ni is bilateral trade after the change and Xni is the value before any change. The resulting
change in total exports after the policy change is simply the sum over all import countries with the
exception of country i’s home market. Furthermore, we can decompose the change in total exports
(Eˆi) as the sum of changes in the expenditure shares and the aggregate expenditure in international
5For exposition purposes we do not present the derivations of the market clearing condition and refer to Dekle et al.
(2007) for the details.
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This equation is extremely general and simply states that the change in a country’s total exports
corresponds to the weighted sum of all proportional changes in bilateral exports. Weights are the
initial share of each bilateral flow in total exports. The change in each bilateral flow can have two
origins: i) an increase in total expenditure in destination n, or ii) a change in competitiveness of
country i relative to all other trading partners of n.
As a policy shock, we consider an exogenous change in the nominal exchange rate of country
i, ri, which is independent of the exchange rate in all other countries. The shock to ri acts like a
shifter of delivered prices to the consumer (which assumes complete pass-through at this stage).6
Without migration or other affects to the population, we have changes in output given by changes
in the nominal exchange rate and wages, rˆiwˆi = Yˆi. Assuming that technology and trade costs are
unaffected by the shock, the implied change in the bilateral trade shares resulting from a change in












where the change in the price index of country n is equal to the change in country i’s exchange rate














Plugging the calculated trade shares back into the market clearing condition, one can solve for
the changes in production of each country of origin. The resulting changes in equilibrium wages (wi)





















(rˆnwˆnYn + Dn) . (6)
Note that, in this model, a nominal exchange rate shock will affect relative prices and lead to
changes in trade flows. The reason is that we fix the trade deficit in international currency, i.e., in
US dollars. Given this assumption, the wage adjustment will not be one-to-one with exchange rate
change and depends on the dollar value of the current account deficit.7 As such, this scenario will be
6In this model the exchange rate shock is a nominal shock that changes the unit of account of prices.
7Alternatively, if one assumes that the ratio of the current account deficit to GDP is constant or trade is balanced
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instructive to understand potential aggregation biases when constructing an effective exchange rate
in general equilibrium.8
To obtain the export equation, we can simply apply equation 4 into equation 3. Taking logs and
assuming that prices are set in the international currency,9 we can write the log change in exports as
a function of the log change in the real exchange rate (RERi) and foreign demand as









Xˆn = rˆnwˆnYn + Dn represents changes in absorption and the real exchange rate is defined as the
change in the nominal exchange rate and the change in the producer price in the exporting country





Equation 7 implies that, under the assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution, there is
no aggregation bias in aggregate macro exchange rate regressions. In order to obtain these unbiased
estimates, one needs to regress the log of the change in nominal exports on the log of the change in
the real exchange rate and the foreign demand deflated by changes in the importer’s price index:









βRER will be the estimated exchange rate elasticity, βX the corresponding demand elasticity and ei
the error term. However, to our knowledge, there is no paper running regressions based on equa-
tion 8. Instead, the literature focuses on trade-weighted real (or nominal) effective exchange rate
regressions, which aggregate bilateral exchange rates to a single country-specific indicator. Next, we
discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the effective exchange rate regressions used in applied work
and relate them to the structural gravity framework.
(Dn = 0,∀n), then changes in the exchange rate will be one-to-one offset by changes in the local wage and have no real





















(rˆnwˆn (Yn + Dn))
The appendix discusses this point in more detail and provides a proof that a nominal exchange rate shock has real
effects when fixing the current account deficit in international dollars.
8Anderson et al. (2016) consider an alternative approach that leads to changes in relative prices across countries after a
nominal exchange rate shock. They assume an exogenous degree of incomplete exchange rate pass-through into import
prices (rˆi = rˆ
ρn
i where ρn is the exogenous degree of import pass-through). However, in this case aggregation of the
bilateral flows to an effective exchange rate without bias will not be possible. The change in the exporter’s price will
depend on the importing country n and cannot be separated from the demand effect as in equation 7.
9 We discuss the importance of this assumption together with alternative pricing assumptions on the exchange rate
pass-through in section 5.
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3 The real effective exchange rate approach
McGuirk (1986) is the standard reference that describes the methods used to construct an aggre-
gate price competitiveness indicator, or the real effective exchange rate. This indicator attempts to
measure a country’s price change in the tradable sector relative to those of other countries after con-
verting each of them into a common currency. In this section we show that aggregation based on the
effective exchange rate relies on a functional form approximation and that using this indicator for
parameter inference will lead to bias in the estimated coefficients.
The theoretical foundations of the McGuirk (1986) approach rests on the Armington (1969) as-
sumption of imperfect substitutability between goods and a constant elasticity of substitution (CES),
which is consistent with structural gravity. The starting point is writing the bilateral import demand
function of country n for goods from country i , Xni, as a function of total expenditure Xn and the
bilateral shares defined in equation 2. Taking the log and considering the change from the initial
equilibrium to the new equilibrium ln Xˆni = 4 lnXni = (lnX′ni − lnXni), we get







+ ln Xˆn, (9)
where ln Pˆni denotes the change in the price that exporting country i charges to consumers in coun-
try n and ln Pˆn is the change in the price index of the importing country n, both denoted in local
currency.10 Concerning the changes in the importing country’s price changes, McGuirk (1986) ap-











where Pˆkk represents the change in producer price index in country k and pink is the expenditure
shares of country n. Using further simplifications outlined in the appendix, we can substitute the
import price index in equation 9 with equation 10 and aggregate across all importing countries. To
do so, we sum the bilateral trade flows over all markets (excluding the home market) by weighting
the flows by the share of i’s output sold in each market:
∑
n 6=i














where the weight ωni is defined as the share of export revenues of country i that comes from sales
in destination n with respect to total export sales. Next, we define the double-weighted real effective
exchange rate (REER) as follows:
10Based on the model in section 2 and the assumption that trade costs are fixed, the change in the foreign price equals




















and write the standard REER regression used in the literature as
ln Eˆi = βREER ln ˆREERi + βX ∑
n 6=i
ωni ln Xˆn + ei, (12)
where βREER is the estimated exchange rate elasticity of specification and βX the demand elasticity.
ei represents the estimation error. The estimation produces unbiased estimates if the exchange rate
elasticity (βˆREER) is equal to θ and if the foreign demand elasticity (βˆX) is equal to one.
3.1 Aggregation bias
The essential difference between the REER regression in equation 12 and the ideal-REER regression
implied by gravity in equation 7 is that the change in total exports is approximately equal to the
weighted sum of the bilateral export changes, i.e., ln Eˆi ≈ ∑n 6=i ωni ln Xˆni. To see the difference
between the two approaches explicitly, we rewrite the REER in equation 9 as a weighted average of
the bilateral real exchange rate without substituting for the importer’s price index using equation
10. The resulting change in the REER is simply the log difference between the changes in the real
exchange rate (RER) of exporter i and a weighted average of the price index changes of every trading
partner:










Substituting the implied REER in equation 13 back into the standard REER regression defined
in equation 12, we can compare the ideal REER regression in equation 7 with the standard REER
regression:






















Canceling the RERi on both sides and rewriting the destination-specific terms, we can apply


















11The result follows from Jensen’s inequality and parallels the proof of the inequality of arithmetic and geometric






Equation 14 states that the log of total exports (the LHS) is larger than the weighted average of the
bilateral trade flows (the RHS). The difference between the two expressions is related to the Theil
inequality index12, which measures the heterogeneity in the destination-specific changes. Intuitively,
the Theil index and the resulting bias will be larger the higher the variance is from destination-
specific shocks. In the extreme case, if prices and demand change only in one destination, the Theil
index is at a maximum value and the estimation biases in the demand and exchange rate elasticities of
the REER approach will be at their largest.13 On the other hand, when the price and demand changes
in all destinations are the same, the Theil index will be zero and both regression specifications will
lead to the same elasticities. In the simulation section, we quantify the estimation biases as a function
of the exchange rate shocks and the trade elasticity. Before, we discuss other real effective exchange
rate regression specifications found in the literature starting with an alternative weighting scheme.
3.2 Weighting scheme
The effective exchange rate calculated by policy institutions such as the IMF (Bayoumi et al. (2005)),
the European Central Bank (ECB) (Schmitz et al. (2011)) and the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) (Klau and Fung (2006)) follows the double weighting approach approach of McGuirk (1986)
but uses slightly different weights. Their calculations include the sales of the exporter country in its
domestic market. The REER is defined as follows:
















where ψik is the export weight including the home market shares. ψik relates to our export weights









However, as Bayoumi et al. (2005) note, the weights implied by equation 15 do not sum to 1. As
a result, the weights are normalized leading to the following definition:14





, where wi is the importance weight of observation i’s
characteristic xi. The sum of wi over all observations i equals one. µ is the corresponding arithmetic mean.
13New Zealand is a good example. An exchange rate shock to the New Zealand dollar will change prices and demand
in Australia but is likely to have little impact on other parts of the world.




∑Nn=1 ψni (1− pini)
(16)
The denominator of equation 16 ensures that TWki sums to 1. The resulting estimation equation is
then given by
ln Eˆi = βREER ln ˆREERIMFi + βX∑
k 6=i
ωni ln Xˆn + ei, (17)
where the weights for the foreign demand continue to be the export shares ωni. We do not have any
prior on the direction of the bias in the demand (βX) and the exchange rate elasticity (βRER) caused
by the weighting scheme and refer to section 4 for the quantitative simulation results.
3.3 Multilateral resistance term
The value of exports depends not only on the country’s export price and foreign demand, but also
on the willingness of foreigners to substitute domestic for foreign goods. The multilateral resistance
term Φn defined in equation 1 picks this idea up. This subsection discusses the estimation bias in the
demand and trade elasticities provoked by the absence of the multilateral terms in the ideal-REER
and the standard REER regression approach.
The first point to note is that the change in the multilateral resistance term summarizes all the
price changes due to variations in the competitiveness of exporter n as well as changes in country i’s













In our framework, the price change in exporter’s competitiveness Pˆkk is simply given by the
change in the exporter’s per unit costs of production (wages and intermediate input prices) and the
exchange rate. The parameter θ describes consumers’ willingness to substitute domestic for foreign
goods following a price change. Omitting the multilateral resistance term in the export equation, we
run the following regression:







ωniXˆn + ui (19)





ei. The omitted variable bias in the estimate of θ depends on the co-variance between the change in
the exporter’s price and the multilateral resistance term:
12
βˆRER = −θ +
Cov
(








In general, the multilateral resistance term will be positively correlated with changes in the real
exchange rate. The following example with the US as the exporter and Canada as the importer illus-
trates this correlation. Suppose that the US dollar depreciates (rˆi ↑), which increases competitiveness
of US exports in all destinations. Depending on the Canadian expenditure share on goods from the
US, this change lowers the Canadian price index directly by making US goods cheaper and indirectly
by reducing Canadian producer prices through lower costs for intermediate inputs. More generally,
countries with the highest expenditure share on US goods (Canada and Mexico) will experience the
largest decline in prices. Given that the multilateral resistance term in equation 18 depends neg-
atively on the price index, the correlation with the exchange rate shock is positive and the trade
elasticity will be biased towards zero.
Similarly, the bias in the demand elasticity depends on the co-variance between the change in












In this case we expect a downward bias in the demand elasticity due to a positive correlation
between the multilateral resistance term and foreign demand. The reasoning parallels the correlation
with the real exchange rate. An exchange rate depreciation of country i, ri, reduces the price index in
destination n and increases the multilateral resistance term. The lower prices increase demand and
imply a positive correlation between the multilateral resistance term and foreign demand.
So far, we have shown that if the assumptions of structural gravity hold, one can consistently
aggregate bilateral exchange rate changes and estimate the trade and demand elasticities using the
aggregate export equation. However, the empirical literature follows an alternative approach based
on real effective exchange rates that essentially approximates the aggregate change of exports using
a weighted average of changes in bilateral exports. As we have shown, this approximation will
lead to an aggregation bias in the estimated elasticities if the underlying exogenous shock causes
a heterogeneous response in bilateral trade. We have also discussed alternative approaches in the
applied literature that are based on differences in the weighting scheme as well as highlighted the
importance of accounting for the multilateral resistance term. In the following section, we simulate a
standard structural gravity model in order to quantify the magnitude of the estimation biases when
using real effective exchange rate regressions for parameter inference.
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4 Simulation results
Having described the underlying micro-structure, we quantify potential estimation bias in various
exchange rate regression specifications using the data set provided by Dekle et al. (2007). These data
comprise bilateral trade flows in manufactures, GDP as well as balance of payments information for
39 countries (plus the Rest of the World) in the year 2004.15
1. Ideal-REER
The first specification captures the real exchange rate model implied by the exact hat algebra in
equation 8. This ideal-REER regression is the benchmark specification and will produce unbiased
estimates of the trade elasticity (β1RER = −θ) and the foreign demand elasticity (β1X = 1) with no
error. Note that the regression equation 8 is non-linear because the trade elasticity is unknown. We
estimate the relevant elasticities using SILS (structurally iterated least squares) as described in Head
and Mayer (2014).
2. Multilateral resistance (“Gold medal mistake”)
An important problem when estimating REER regressions is the presence of the multilateral resis-
tance term. This term captures the implied price changes in the rest of the world due to policy shocks.
We assess the importance of the omitted variable bias due to the absence of the multilateral terms by
estimating equation 19.
3. Real effective exchange rate à la McGuirk
The third specification quantifies the aggregation bias when estimating the double-weighted REER
regression in equation 12.
4. Approximation via log changes
One difference between the double-weighted REER regression à la McGuirk and the ideal-REER
regression is that the multilateral resistance term deflates export prices rather than foreign demand.
To assess the importance of this functional form assumption, we approximate the baseline regression
with log changes and keep the non-linear form of equation 8:











Similar to the baseline specification, we estimate equation 22 non-linearly using SILS.
15The bilateral trade share matrix is a sufficient statistic for a set of parameters including trade costs. For further details,
please refer directly to Dekle et al. (2007).
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5. Real effective exchange rate with different weights
The fifth specification quantifies the estimation bias when running a double-weighted REER regres-
sion and using an alternative weighting scheme, i.e., IMF weights, as defined in equation 17.
For each of the 5 specifications, we consider two types of policy experiments. The first one is
the partial equilibrium approach (modular trade impact (MTI) counterfactual), where we consider
an exogenous change in the nominal exchange rate and assume that wages do not adjust (however,
intermediate input prices do adjust). In the second experiment, the general equilibrium trade inte-
gration (GETI) counterfactual, wages and prices will fully adjust following a shock to the nominal
exchange rate.
4.1 Modular Trade Impact (MTI) counterfactual
The MTI counterfactual considers changes in prices and leaves wages constant by allowing the trade
deficit to change. This case is identical to the one considered by McGuirk (1986). This approach
allows us to abstract from income changes in the interpretation of the bias in the exchange rate elas-
ticity. The counterfactual consists of a random nominal exchange rate shock (rˆi) specific to country i
(France, for example), keeping the exchange rates of all other countries fixed. Each shock is drawn
from a normal distribution with a variance of 0.1 (equivalent to a 10 percent appreciation or depreci-
ation). For every country, we run 100 different exchange rate shocks to obtain a sample of 39x39x100
data points. Next, we run a cross-section OLS regression for each replication and record the demand
and exchange rate coefficients. Table 1 contains the results.
The top value in Table 1 reports the average exchange rate and demand elasticity for the 3900
estimated coefficients. The second row corresponds to the implied bias of the estimate, i.e., the dif-
ference between the sample mean and the true value of the coefficients. The third row shows the
standard deviation of the estimates. Lastly, the fourth row gives the square root of the estimated
mean squared error (MSE), our selection criteria for the specification with the lowest aggregation
bias. The first column shows the results for the baseline specification. The estimates are equal to the
true values of the elasticities (−4 and 1, respectively) and therefore unbiased.16 All other specifica-
tions lead to a bias. In general, the bias is more pronounced for the demand than for the exchange rate
elasticities. The MSE for the demand elasticities is significantly larger than the MSE for the exchange
rate elasticities. The omission of the multilateral resistance term in Specification 2 (the “Gold medal
mistake”) shown in column (2) produces the largest biases for the exchange rate elasticity (-3.872).
The specifications with the smallest bias are the double-weighted REER approach à la McGuirk in
column (3) and the log approximation of the baseline specification in column (4). The point estimate
16In the baseline simulation we calibrate θ = 4, which is a common value found in the literature (see Simonovska and
Waugh (2014)). However, the magnitude of the bias does not depend on the level of this elasticity. Table 9 in the appendix
contains simulation results for when the elasticity is θ = 0.8.
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Table 1: MTI simulated elasticities of country-specific random exchange rate shocks
Baseline GM mistake REER McGuirk d ln approx. Alternative("ideal-REER") ("real-REER") weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exchange rate
Mean -4 -3.872 -4 -4 -3.957
Bias 0 .128 0 0 .043
Std dev. 0 .247 .004 .003 .08
MSE 1/2 0 .278 .004 .003 .091
Foreign demand
Mean 1 0 0 1.002 0
Bias 0 0 0 .002 0
Std dev. 0 0 0 .039 0
MSE 1/2 0 0 0 .039 0
Notes: The sample consists of 39 countries and each country receives 100 random exchange rate shocks. The total number
of estimated exchange rate and demand elasticities is 3900 for each of the 5 different specifications. The top cell labeled
"Mean" reports the sample mean of the respective estimates for each type of elasticity. The rows labeled "Bias" give the
estimated bias, where est. bias = sample mean - true value. Rows labeled "Std Dev." give the sample standard deviation
of the 3900 point estimates. Rows labeled "MSE1/2" give the square root of the estimated mean squared error (MSE),
where estimated MSE = (est. bias)2 + (std dev)2.
of the exchange rate elasticity is -4 with a standard deviation smaller than 0.001. The coefficient of
the demand elasticity for the log approximation is slightly larger than 1 with 1.002. Finally, the last
column (5) shows the bias in the case of alternative weights, which overestimates the exchange rate
elasticity (-3.957).
In addition to the average elasticities reported in table 1, figure 1 plots the country-specific bias
in the exchange rate elasticity as a function of the exchange rate shock. The magnitude of the bias
increases in the size of the exchange rate shock in all specifications. We also observe that in the case
of the “McGuirk” (sub-figure b) and the “log-approximation” (sub-figure c) that the direction of the
bias is the opposite of the exchange rate shock (a depreciation leads to a downward bias while an
appreciation leads to an upward bias). The other two scenarios show the importance of using the
adequate functional form. Omitting the variation in the weighted average of the competitor’s price
index (scenario “Gold medal mistake”) or having the wrong weighting scheme (scenario “Alterna-
tive weights”) leads to larger biases for countries that have more important implications in the inter-
national trading system. For example, the United States has the largest bias because it is, on average,
the most important trading partner for the countries in our sample and, as a result, an exchange rate
shock to the US dollar induces the largest variation in the partner countries’ price indexes.
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Exchange rate shock
Specification 2: Gold medal mistake
Exchange rate shock vs. magnitude of exchange rate bias
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Exchange rate shock
Specification 3: REER a la McGuirk
Exchange rate shock vs. magnitude of exchange rate bias
(b) McGuirk
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Exchange rate shock
Specification 4: dln approximation
Exchange rate shock vs. magnitude of exchange rate bias
(c) Log-approximation
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Specification 5: Alternative weights
Exchange rate shock vs. magnitude of exchange rate bias
(d) Alternative weights
Figure 1: MTI: Relationship between an exchange rate shock and the bias of the exchange rate elasticity for
θ = 4.
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Table 2: GETI simulated elasticities of country-specific random exchange rate shocks
Baseline GM mistake REER McGuirk d ln approx. Alternative("ideal-REER") ("real-REER") weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exchange rate
Mean -4 -3.74 -4 -4.001 -3.918
Bias 0 .26 0 0.001 .082
Std dev. 0 .045 .019 .032 .022
MSE 1/2 0 .264 .019 .032 .085
Foreign demand
Mean 1 .988 1.004 1.004 1.002
Bias 0 .012 .004 .004 .002
Std dev. 0 .023 .053 .053 .053
MSE 1/2 0 .026 .053 .053 .053
Notes: The sample consists of 39 countries and each country receives 100 random exchange rate shocks. The total number
of estimated exchange rate and demand elasticities is 3900 for each of the 5 different specifiations. The top cell labeled
"Mean" reports the sample mean of the respective estimates for each type of elasticity. The rows labeled "Bias" give the
estimated bias, where est. bias = sample mean - true value. Rows labeled "Std Dev." give the sample standard deviation
of the 3900 point estimates. Rows labeled "MSE1/2" give the square root of the estimated mean squared error (MSE),
where estimated MSE = (est. bias)2 + (std dev)2.
4.2 General Equilibrium Trade Integration (GETI) counterfactual
In the GETI counterfactual, we allow wages to adjust following an exchange rate shock. In particular,
we impose that wages have to adjust in order to keep the current account imbalance constant in
international currency. To engineer an exchange rate shock in the general equilibrium, we use the
same exchange rate shocks as in the MTI part. When a country receives an idiosyncratic exchange
rate shock, the exchange rate does not change for other countries. However, exports change for all
countries because prices and wages adjust after the shock. Table 2 presents the general equilibrium
results using a trade elasticity of 4.
The direction and the magnitude of the underlying biases in the exchange rate elasticities are
similar to the MTI version. Wrong functional form assumptions and incorrect weighting schemes
in the scenarios “Gold medal mistake” and “Alternative weights” bias the exchange rate elasticity
towards zero. The key difference is the increase in the estimation error captured by the MSE. Figures
2 and 3 illustrate this change by plotting the bias in the exchange rate and the demand elasticity as
a function of the exchange rate shock for the four different scenarios. In the GETI counterfactual
an exchange rate shock leads to a much larger estimation bias than in the MTI. The reason why
the average biases are small is that they move in the opposite direction of the exchange rate shock
(appreciation leads to upward bias and depreciation leads to downward bias) and cancel each other
out when averaging.
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Specification 3: REER a la McGuirk
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Exchange rate shock vs. magnitude of exchange rate bias
(c) Log-approximation
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Specification 5: Alternative weights
Exchange rate shock vs. magnitude of exchange rate bias
(d) Alternative weights
Figure 2: GETI: Relationship between exchange rate shock and the bias in the exchange rate elasticity.
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Specification 3: REER a la McGuirk
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Specification 5: Alternative weights
Exchange rate shock vs. magnitude of demand bias
(d) Alternative weights
Figure 3: GETI: Relationship between exchange rate shock and the bias in the demand elasticity.
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Table 3: GETI simulated elasticities of country-specific random exchange rate shocks, stochastic trade costs
and θ = −4.
Baseline GM mistake REER McGuirk d ln approx. Alternative("ideal-REER") ("real-REER") weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exchange rate
Mean -4 -3.951 -4.022 -4.041 -3.997
Bias 0 .049 .022 .041 .003
Std dev. 0 .141 .171 .166 .178
MSE 1/2 0 .149 .173 .171 .178
Foreign demand
Mean 1 1.28 1.111 1.092 1.192
Bias 0 .28 .111 .092 .192
Std dev. 0 .28 .247 .262 .335
MSE 1/2 0 .396 .270 .278 .386
Notes: The sample consists of 39 countries and each country receives 100 random exchange rate and trade cost shocks.
The total number of estimated exchange rate and demand elasticities is 3900 for each of the 5 different specifications.
The top cell labeled "Mean" reports the sample mean of the respective estimates for each type of elasticity. The rows
labeled "Bias" give the estimated bias, where est. bias = sample mean - true value. Rows labeled "Std Dev." give the
sample standard deviation of the 3900 point estimates. Rows labeled "MSE1/2" give the square root of the estimated
mean squared error (MSE), where estimated MSE = (est. bias)2 + (std dev)2.
4.3 Monte-Carlo with stochastic trade costs
Up until now, our simulations are based on the assumption that the structural gravity equation is the
true data-generating process for bilateral trade flows. To allow for the fact that the gravity equation
does not perfectly explain bilateral trade flows, we run a Monte Carlo exercise and assume, as in
Head and Mayer (2014), that bilateral trade flows change due to a stochastic term ηni in the trade
cost function:
φni = exp(− ln Distni)ηni, (23)
where Distni is the distance between importer n and exporter i. ηni is a log-normal random term
and the only stochastic term in the simulation since GDP and distance are all set by actual data. We
calibrate the variance of ln(ηni) to replicate the root mean squared error of the least squares dummy
variables (LSDV) regression on real data. We use the method of Dekle et al. (2007) and solve the
model in changes. Based on actual data in trade flows and incomes, we first simulate changes in
the trade costs with a random shock ηˆni, i.e. τˆni = ηˆni, and then calculate the changes in wages, the
prices for intermediate goods and the aggregate price indexes resulting from the random exchange
rate shock.
Table 3 reports the results. Introducing stochastic trade costs increases the bias and the esti-
mation error. The MSE significantly increases for the point estimates of the exchange rate and the
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demand elasticities. Interestingly, the bias in the demand elasticity becomes more pronounced than
in the exchange rate elasticity. Across specifications, the average magnitude of the bias is close to 20
percent for the demand elasticity, whereas it is close to 1 percent for the exchange rate elasticity. The
specification with the lowest MSE is the log approximation in column (4), suggesting that deflating
the changes in foreign demand by changes in the aggregate price index is important to reduce the
bias in the demand elasticity. These simulation results suggest that with the ideal-REER approach it
is possible to estimate the response of aggregate exports to exchange rate changes without bias even
if the data-generating process does not fully adhere to structural gravity.
5 Exchange rate pass-through and currency denomination
We derived our ideal-REER regression specification under two important assumptions. First, markups
do not vary with the exchange rate. Second, prices are set in an international currency. In this section,
we relax these assumptions and discuss alternative estimation methods based on different pricing as-
sumptions.
One way to change the exporter’s price response to exchange rates is to follow Anderson et al.
(2016) and assume an exogenous pass-through coefficient $in. The pass-through coefficient $in cap-
tures the exporter’s price adjustment following a variation in the exchange rate, for example, due to
changes in the markup or price rigidities in the invoicing currency. The coefficient is defined on the
unit interval 0 < $in < 1. If the pass-through is complete, the exporter will pass on the entire bilat-
eral exchange rate variation to the importer and $in = 0. If the export price is fixed in the destination
currency and the exporter absorbs all of the exchange rate variation by changing the markup, the
pass-through coefficient equals one, $in = 1. Given this definition, we can write the change in the







However, if the pass-through coefficient varies at the bilateral level, we will not be able to iden-
tify all parameters at the aggregate level:











because the number of parameters to estimate is larger than the number of export equations.
Instead, we rely on the dominant currency paradigm (DCP, see Casas et al. (2017)) and assume
that exporter and importer prices are fixed in the dominant (international) currency. In this case,
the pass-through coefficient depends only on the exchange rate changes vis-à-vis the international
currency ($in = ρiρn). As a result, we can write the bilateral exchange rate as a product of both the
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exporter exchange rate and the importer exchange rate to the international currency and neglect the
co-variance between the two. Reducing the dimensionality further by assuming a common pass-
through coefficient, we can write the DCP export equation as follows:










where the estimated exchange rate elasticity represents the product of the trade elasticity and the
exchange rate pass-through coefficient (ρ), i.e., βREER = θ(1− ρ), for both the exporter-specific and
the importer-specific components. Introducing incomplete pass-through reduces the effect of the
exchange rate but leaves the overall functional form unchanged compared with the baseline specifi-
cation in equation 7. The lower exchange rate elasticity implies a reduction in the magnitude of the
estimation biases in standard REER specifications discussed above. Both the qualitative results and
the country-specific biases plotted in figures 1 to 3 remain the same.
An alternative pricing assumption is that exporters set their prices in the producer’s currency
(Producer Currency Pricing, or PCP) and absorb part of the changes in marginal costs by the com-
mon pass-through coefficient ρ. In this case, we cannot split the bilateral exchange rate into an
exporter/importer component because the importer-specific component depends on the exporter’s
price reaction following an exchange rate shock. The resulting exporter equation is a function of
the change in producer prices in the exporter’s currency and a weighted average of foreign demand
deflated by the price index converted into the exporter’s currency:














The estimated exchange rate elasticity is the same for the exporter- and importer-specific com-
ponents only if exchange rate pass-through is complete, i.e., $ = 0. If exchange rate pass-through
is incomplete ($ > 0), the importer-specific component depends on the exporter’s price reaction
following an exchange rate shock and the estimated exchange rate elasticity βREER will be biased.17
Finally, the third common pricing assumption is that exporters set their prices in the destina-
tion’s currency (Local Currency Pricing, or LCP). Under LCP, exporters absorb the bilateral exchange
rate variation and the pass-through on import prices is zero. In this case, the exchange rate shock
does not affect prices, demand and exports. As a result, there is no counterfactual variation.
Overall, consistent aggregation under incomplete pass-through is only possible when prices
are set in an international currency as postulated by the dominant currency paradigm. If prices
are set in the producer’s currency (producer currency pricing (PCP)) or in the local currency (local
currency pricing (LCP)), the pass-through depends on the bilateral exchange rate, and estimation
of the aggregate elasticities without bias is only possible if pass-through is complete. Next, we test
17Our simulation results, presented in the appendix, show that under the assumption of the complete pass-through
the estimation biases in standard REER specifications with PCP are qualitatively similar to the ones under DCP.
23
whether the ideal-REER approach also reduces the estimation bias when aggregating bilateral data
empirically.
6 Empirical evidence
A key implication from the theoretical analysis is that running exchange rate regressions on the bilat-
eral or on the aggregate level does not lead to a significant bias in the elasticities if the trade elasticity
is the same for all countries. While recognizing that in practice exchange rate elasticities differ across
countries (see, for example, Spilimbergo and Vamvakidis (2003) or Bussière et al. (2016)), we test the
theoretical prediction of no-significant bias in exchange rate regressions when pooling across coun-
tries. Later we relax this assumption and test for significant differences between elasticities estimated
on the bilateral and aggregate levels on a country-per-country basis.
Our empirical approach uses data for bilateral exchange rates from the IMF financial statistics
database. Data on real effective exchange rates are coming from the Bank for International Settle-
ments. We use the Narrow Index as it has the advantage of covering a longer sample period. The
Narrow Index is a trade-weighted effective exchange rate over 25 economies (excluding the euro
area). Inflation (proxied by the GDP deflator) and nominal GDP data are from national accounts and
converted into international currency (USD) using the bilateral exchange rate with the USD. Bilateral
trade data are retrieved from CEPII’s historical trade database (see Fouquin and Hugot (2016)). We
use absorption, defined as GDP minus net exports, to be a proxy for foreign demand. For changes in
aggregate export prices, we use producer price indexes (PPI) from national accounts, the OECD and
the IMF depending on data availability. Taken together, our sample comprises a panel of 25 countries
with yearly observations from 1964 to 2014.
Given that the ideal-REER estimation equation depends on the currency denomination of trade
flows, the first step is to run exchange rate pass-through regressions and shed light on the pricing
behavior of exporters. To estimate the reaction of export prices to exchange rate changes, we follow
Casas et al. (2017) and regress the export price of country i to country j (denominated in country
i’s currency,PEi,j,t) on country i’s exchange rate with the USD (ri,USD,t), the bilateral exchange rate
between country i and country j (rij,t) and the producer price index of country i (PPIi,t), a proxy for
changes in marginal costs:
∆ ln PEi,j,t = α1∆ ln ri,USD,t + α2∆ ln ri,j,t + α3∆ ln PPIi,t + ui,j,t
The results in Table 4 show that the export price varies mainly with the USD exchange rate.
The estimated coefficient of the USD exchange rate is −0.15 compared with a bilateral exchange rate
coefficient of −0.05 (see column (4)).
We repeat the exercise for the import side and estimate the reaction of the import price denomi-
nated in importer’s currency to exchange rate changes with the following specification:
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Table 4: Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Export Prices
Dependent variable: Log-change (exporter price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log-change (exchange rate to USD) 0.341∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.149∗∗
(0.0794) (0.120) (0.0508) (0.0403)
Log-change (bilateral exchange rate) 0.134∗∗ 0.0517∗∗
(0.0423) (0.0169)
Log-change (producer price index) 0.759∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗
(0.0617) (0.0680)
Observations 29350 29350 29350 29350
R2 0.305 0.331 0.625 0.629
Standard errors clustered at the exporting country in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
∆ ln PIi,j,t = α1∆ ln ri,USD,t + α2∆ ln ri,j,t + α3∆ ln PPIj,t + ui,j,t,
where PIi,j,t denotes the import price of country i from country j (denominated in country j’s cur-
rency). Similar to the export price, the variation of the import price is predominantly driven by the
USD exchange rate. Table 5 column (4) shows that the pass-through coefficient for the USD import
price is −0.89 while the coefficient of the bilateral exchange rate is −0.21. These findings are similar
to Casas et al. (2017) and support the dominant currency paradigm.
Table 5: Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Import Prices
Dependent variable: Log-change (importer price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log-change (exchange rate to USD) 0.445∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗
(0.00752) (0.00986) (0.00811) (0.0124)
Log-change (bilateral exchange rate) 0.170∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.00651) (0.0104)
Log-change (producer price index) 0.434∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗
(0.00687) (0.0112)
Observations 29350 29350 29350 29350
R2 0.383 0.414 0.539 0.563
Standard errors clustered at the importing country in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Next, we evaluate the empirical performance of regression specifications 1 to 5 discussed in the
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Table 6: Empirical results with variables denominated in current USD (DCP)
Bilateral Aggregate
Baseline GM mistake REER McGuirk d ln approx. Alternative("ideal-REER") ("real-REER") weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exchange rate
Point estimate -.459 -.409 -.380 -.584 -.291 -.254
Std. error (0.024) (0.051) (0.059) (0.057) (0.066) (0.067)
Foreign demand
Point estimate 1.184 1.199 .758 1.092 1.207 1.122
Std. error. (0.027) (0.063) (0.048) (0.037) (0.083) (0.049)
Observations 27940 1077 1077 1142 1077 1198
R2 .157 .567 .570 .612 .579 .516
Notes: The sample consists of 25 countries over the period 1964-2014.
simulation section. We convert all variables into US dollars and use the following definitions for the
real exchange rate and foreign demand.18 The real exchange rate of exporter i (RERit) is defined as
the change in the nominal exchange rate of country i vis-à-vis the USD multiplied by the change
in the PPI of country i. To calculate foreign demand, we use the current value of absorption in the
importing country j denominated in the international currency (Xjt). Inflation proxies for changes in
the importer’s price index (Pˆjt). For the weights ωnit, we use the share of exports of country i going
to country n in year t. This definition of the variables applies to all aggregate regressions with the
exception of the REER in the “alternative weights” specification defined in equation 17. In this case,
we use the BIS Narrow Index as the REER’s empirical counterpart.
The results are shown in table 6. The first observation is that the elasticities estimated from
bilateral trade flows and from aggregate trade flows using the ideal-REER approach are not signif-
icantly different from each other. The point estimate of the exchange rate elasticity using bilateral
flows is −0.46 (column (1)) and the estimate using the ideal-REER is −0.41 (column (2)). The de-
mand elasticities are almost identical with the point estimates of 1.18 and 1.19, respectively. For
all other specifications (columns (3) to (6)), the aggregation method results in significant differences
in the estimated elasticities compared with the bilateral level in column (1). The specification with
the largest gap is the “Gold medal (GM) mistake” approach in column (3) with a point estimate of
−0.38 for the exchange rate and 0.76 for the demand elasticity. The standard REER approach based
on McGuirk (column (4)) fits the data best with the highest R2 but produces a higher exchange rate
(−0.58) and a lower demand elasticity (1.09). The specification with the lowest R2 is the “Alterna-
tive weights” approach in column (6). Overall, these results highlight the trade-off one faces when
18The US is the reference for all countries in our sample except for the US. In this case, the reference currency is the
pound sterling.
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deciding which elasticities to use. If forecasting is the main objective, then the model with the best
fit may be the preferred one. If the aim is to use the elasticities of the standard REER approach to
calibrate a macro-model, which relies on aggregate export equations to summarize trade linkages
between the different regions in the model, then the counterfactual predictions are inconsistent with
the “micro-level” foundations implied by structural gravity. In this case, the estimates obtained from
the ideal-REER regression may be the preferred ones.
The pooled estimates in table 6 hide potential heterogeneity in the exchange rate elasticities
across countries. Spilimbergo and Vamvakidis (2003) (and many others later) documented this cross-
country heterogeneity. We investigate this point further by running the bilateral and the aggregate
real exchange rate regressions on a country-per-country basis. We obtain country-specific exchange
rate and demand elasticities to test whether they differ in a significant way.
Figure 4 plots the relationship between the elasticities obtained from bilateral and aggregate re-
gressions based on the ideal-REER approach (panel a) as well as the standard REER approach à la
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McGuirk (panel b). All four panels exhibit significant variation in elasticities across countries and
these results are smaller for elasticities estimated on the bilateral than on the aggregate level. One
possible explanation is the limited number of observations. The aggregate country-specific regres-
sions consist of a time-series analysis with 50 years of observations. In contrast, the bilateral variation
consists of up to 1200 observations (50 years multiplied by the number of trading partners). In the
absence of an aggregation bias, we would expect that the difference in the elasticities does not move
in a particular direction, i.e., the difference between the elasticities should be more or less propor-
tional to the size of the country-specific elasticities. In other words, the best linear fit between the
two sets of elasticities should have a slope close to 1. For this reason, we include the best linear fit
(in blue) with the 95 percent confidence interval as well as the 45 degree line (in red) into figure 4.
Note that in all cases the estimated slope is lower than 1, which confirms the initial observation that
the cross-country variation in the elasticities estimated on the bilateral level is smaller than those
obtained from the aggregate level.
With respect to a potential aggregation bias, we expect that the ideal-REER approach will result
in smaller differences between the elasticities than the standard REER approach. Panels (a) and (b)
in figure 4 show that this is indeed the case: the absolute difference between the point estimates of
the elasticities obtained from bilateral trade flows and the ones obtained from aggregate trade flows
is smaller for the ideal-REER approach compared with the standard REER approach. Moreover,
the difference is less biased in a particular direction, i.e., the best linear fit (in blue) of the ideal-REER
estimates is closer to the 45 degree line (in red) than the best linear fit of the standard REER estimates.
Taken together, the empirical results support our theoretical findings, namely that the difference in
the elasticities is related to the functional form assumption in the aggregation of bilateral trade flows.
The ideal-REER approach aggregates the bilateral variation in accordance with the gravity model and
reduces bias from the aggregation.
Before concluding, we consider an alternative pricing paradigm and estimate our empirical
specifications in accordance with the PCP shown in equation 25. Table 7 shows the estimated co-
efficients. The main difference with respect to the evidence based on DCP is that denominating the
variables in the producer’s currency worsens the estimation performance. Compared with table 6,
the R2 and the point estimates of the elasticities are lower while the standard errors of the elastic-
ities are higher in all specifications of table 7. With respect to the differences in elasticities across
different levels of aggregation, the ideal-REER elasticities are closest to the ones estimated on the
bilateral level. All other specifications lead to significant differences in elasticities with respect to the
bilateral level. Overall, these results suggest that currency denomination matters for the estimation
performance and the quantitative results but not for the qualitative results on the aggregation bias.
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Table 7: Empirical results with variables denominated in the exporter’s currency (PCP)
Bilateral Aggregate
Baseline GM mistake REER McGuirk d ln approx. Alternative("ideal-REER") ("real-REER") weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exchange rate
Point estimate -.461 -.384 -.289 -.567 -.243 -.181
Std. error (0.039) (0.072) (0.057) (0.062) (0.082) (0.074)
Foreign demand
Point estimate 1.132 1.102 .942 1.066 1.095 .979
Std. error. (0.019) (0.106) (0.096) (0.048) (0.112) (0.072)
Observations 27940 1077 1077 1142 1077 1198
R2 .157 .407 .497 .587 .489 .460
Notes: The sample consists of 25 countries over the period 1964-2014.
7 Conclusion
One reason why country-specific bilateral exchange rate and demand elasticities differ from aggre-
gate elasticities is incorrect aggregation. The standard approach taken in the literature is based on 
functional form assumptions and an incorrect weighting scheme. A consequence of these assump-
tions is that both the trade (exchange rate) and the demand elasticity are biased. However, our sim-
ulations and the empirical evidence show that these biases are quantitatively small but statistically 
significant.
The fact that many macroeconomics models are calibrated with elasticities based on standard 
REER regressions has important policy implications. In particular, models calibrated with the elas-
ticities estimated from aggregate data lead to inaccurate predictions by exaggerating the response of 
exports and, by extension, output following an exchange rate shock. Calibrating these models with 
elasticity estimates using our new ideal-REER regression specification with variables denominated 
in the dominant international currency (i.e., the US dollar) improve the model’s fit and results 
in predictions consistent with microeconomic behavior in bilateral trade equations.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Simulation results for alternative values of θ
Table 8: GETI simulation elasticities of country-specific random exchange rate shocks, stochastic trade costs
and θ = 0.8
Baseline GM mistake REER McGuirk d ln approx. Alternative("ideal-REER") ("real-REER") weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exchange rate
Mean -.8 -.757 -.788 -.787 -.781
Bias 0 .043 .012 .013 .019
Std dev. 0 .101 .126 .124 .132
MSE 1/2 0 .109 .127 .125 .133
Foreign demand
Mean 1 .795 1.092 1.085 1.127
Bias 0 .205 .092 .085 .127
Std dev. 0 .283 .182 .191 .201
MSE 1/2 0 .350 .203 .209 .237
Notes: The sample consists of 39 countries and each country receives 100 random exchange rate and trade cost shocks.
The total number of estimated exchange rate and demand elasticities is 3900 for each of the 5 different specifications.
The top cell labeled "Mean" reports the sample mean of the respective estimates for each type of elasticity. The rows
labeled "Bias" give the estimated bias, where est. bias = sample mean - true value. Rows labeled "Std Dev." give the
sample standard deviation of the 3900 point estimates. Rows labeled "MSE1/2" give the square root of the estimated
mean squared error (MSE), where estimated MSE = (est. bias)2 + (std dev)2.
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8.2 Simulation results for producer currency pricing
Table 9: GETI simulation elasticities of country-specific random exchange rate shocks in producer currency
pricing (PCP) and stochastic trade costs
Baseline GM mistake REER McGuirk d ln approx. Alternative("ideal-REER") ("real-REER") weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exchange rate
Mean -4 -3.891 -4.029 -4.032 -3.967
Bias 0 .119 .029 .032 .033
Std dev. 0 .143 .176 .185 .179
MSE 1/2 0 .186 .178 .187 .182
Foreign demand
Mean 1 1.26 1.112 1.101 1.224
Bias 0 .26 .112 .101 .224
Std dev. 0 .291 .243 .256 .344
MSE 1/2 0 .390 .267 .275 .411
Notes: The sample consists of 39 countries and each country receives 100 random exchange rate and trade cost shocks.
The total number of estimated exchange rate and demand elasticities is 3900 for each of the 5 different specifications.
The top cell labeled "Mean" reports the sample mean of the respective estimates for each type of elasticity. The rows
labeled "Bias" give the estimated bias, where est. bias = sample mean - true value. Rows labeled "Std Dev." give the
sample standard deviation of the 3900 point estimates. Rows labeled "MSE1/2" give the square root of the estimated
mean squared error (MSE), where estimated MSE = (est. bias)2 + (std dev)2.
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8.3 Derivations for McGuirk (1986)










where σ is the elasticity of substitution. Note that by the CES demand, the export price of country k
















































where the second term is a weighted average of percentage changes in market shares and equals











If we consider a log change, we get





where the change in price index is a weighted geometric average of the export price changes.19 Now,
we replace the import price index in the bilateral export equation 9 by the sum of the bilateral prices
19Instead of the approximation of the price index, we can calculate the exact change in the price index by using the hat
notation. Simply, consider equation 26 with the new prices after the policy change (P′n and P′kn) and divide both sides by
Pn. Using the fact that the relative prices equal the import expenditure share (pink = P1−σkn /P
1−σ
n , see equation 27), we





4 lnXni = 4 lnXn − θ
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Note that ∑Kk=1 pink = 1, thus the equation simplifies to
4 lnXni = 4 lnXn − θ
(




and noting again that ∑k 6=i pink = (1− pini), we get the following bilateral equation:








Using the fact that the change in the bilateral price index equals the change in producer prices
denominated in producer currency times the exchange rate, 4 ln Pni = 4 ln riPii and 4 ln Pnk =


















Or, as outlined in the text, in hat notation (using4 ln x = ln xˆ):
∑
n 6=i














8.4 Derivation of alternative weights
Consider the correct REER equation 11. Bayoumi et al. (2005) start from this definition but include
the domestic market share of the exporter i and assumes that the change in the export price is pro-
































Note that we can get ln Pˆi out of the sum by ∑Nn=1 ψni ∑k 6=i pink = ∑
N
n=1 ψni(1 − pini) = 1 −
∑Nn=1 ψnipini:

















which can be rewritten as






























pink = (1− pini)












∑Nn=1 ψni (1− pini)
.
Note that they are wrong for export equations because they include the domestic market of the
exporter in their weights. Also, they are re-normalized, which should not be the case.
8.5 Trade deficit
In the general equilibrium counterfactual we use a nominal exchange rate shock and the presence of
trade deficits to generate variation in income. In the absence of trade deficits a nominal exchange rate
shock will be fully absorbed by the nominal wage of the numeraire country and the shock will not
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have any real effects. When we introducing a trade deficit, the trade literature generally considers
the following two scenarios:20




where Yi is national GDP.




where Y is world GDP.
The assumption that the deficit is a constant fraction of national GDP implies that a nominal exchange
rate shock does not lead to any real effects. On the other hand, if the deficit is fixed in international
currency the exchange rate shock will have real effects. The proof for this statement follows.






















where Xni denotes the bilateral trade flows,Φn the outward andΩi the inward multilateral resistance











, Φn = (Pn)
−θ =∑
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To solve the system of equations, define the shock to the bilateral exchange rate as a function of










20See the Handbook of International Economics chapter by Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014).
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Plugging the exchange rate shocks into the multilateral resistance terms shows that the RHS of


















To complete the proof, we have to show that the LHS of equation 29 is also invariant to exchange


















which is invariant to an exchange rate change. A nominal exchange rate shock does not have any real
effects. If, on the other hand, the deficit is fixed in international currency, we replace total expenditure







In this case the deficit does not change in proportion to the exchange rate shock and the LHS of
equation 29 is not invariant to exchange rate changes. A nominal exchange rate shock will have real
effects.
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